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RECENT DECISIONS
Editor-JULIA M. COOK
ARBITRATION AND AWARD-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION
4A OF TEE NEW YORK ARBITRATION LAw.-Defendant signed and
delivered to plaintiff an order for the purchase of merchandise. The
order provided that all claims, disputes and differences arising out of
the contract should be determined by arbitration pursuant to the
Arbitration Laws of New York.' A dispute under this contract arose
and the defendant refused to accept delivery, whereupon plaintiff
demanded arbitration. The defendant company refusing to appear at
the proceedings, they were conducted without it under the rules of
the arbitration association. A judgment was entered for the plaintiff
pursuant to an order of the Court and the motion of the defendant
for a perpetual injunction, or in the alternative for a submission to a
jury of the question of the existence of a contract was denied. The
Appellate Division reversed the judgment and order on the ground
that there had been denial of due process of law in that it required
the defendant, a party to an alleged arbitration agreement, to waive
either a hearing on the merits of a dispute, or a judicial determination
that he consented to arbitration. On appeal, Held, that section 4A of
the Arbitration Law is constitutional. Finsilver, Still & Morse, Inc.
v. Goldberg, Mass & Co., Inc., 253 N. Y. 382, 171 N. E. 579 (1930).
The Arbitration Law renders valid any award given in arbitra-
tion pursuant to a written contract to arbitrate, but allows a party
who has not joined the arbitration, at any time before a final judg-
ment shall have been given in proceedings to enforce any such award
to apply to the Supreme Court to determine whether any contract to
arbitrate was made.2
That section assures to a party, who either joins in arbitration
proceedings or elects to stay out, the right to keep the proceedings
open by a stay or by adjournments during which time a jury trial
can be had to decide whether a valid contract was entered into in the
beginning. There is no suggestion in the statute that, as a penalty for
resistance, a party who elects to stay out of the arbitration proceed-
ings shall forfeit any rights that would otherwise be his. The proceed-
ings can always be kept open by a stay or by adjournments. Since
these rights are allowed, the unsuccessful denial of the jurisdiction
of the arbitrators will not prejudice the opportunity to go before
them on the merits. Under section 3 of the New York Arbitration
Law, arbitration could proceed only upon an order of the court if a
party to an alleged arbitration agreement refused to take part. This
was so even though the agreement made provision against such
1 Laws of 1920, ch. 275.
2Ibid., sec. 4A (added by Laws of 1927, ch. 352).
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default.3 Thus a non-resident defendant, by avoiding service of an
order of the court to arbitrate, could nullify a just obligation.4 To do
away with the evils thus resulting, section 4A was enacted in 1927,
which makes the agreement self-operative without the need of a court
order. This statute works no undue hardship on the parties. A stat-
ute requiring an analogous election in judicial proceedings has been
held to be constitutional.5 A temporary injunction directed against
the arbitration proceedings would insure the unwilling party all his
rights.6 Such a procedure would not be against public policy and
would fit our modern business plan by preventing unscrupulous per-
sons outside the jurisdiction from escaping their contractual duties
and obligations where a valid and effective award is rendered
against them.
G.L.
BANKS AND BANKING-FOLLOWING TRUST FUNDS IN BANK
DEPOSITS.-Defendant Waggoner, through the instrumentality of
telegrams purporting to come to plaintiffs from their correspondent
banks, induced them to deposit sums of money with the Chase Na-
tional Bank, in this city, to the credit of the Bank of Telluride, of
Colorado, an insolvent bank, of which he was president. Waggoner
thereupon caused three cashier's checks to be drawn on the Chase
National Bank which were blank as to date, name of payee and
amount, and after filling in the blanks with the knowledge of the
Chase National Bank, he procured one of them to be certified, the
amount thereof being charged against the sum deposited by plaintiff
banks. The second check, defendant endorsed in blank and presented
the same to the Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company, which
bank, having knowledge of the manner in which it had been issued,
refused payment thereof, but upon endorsement by the defendant
deposited it to the credit of the Telluride Bank. The third check
was similarly deposited with the Central Bank, which procured the
two checks to be certified by the Chase Bank and when paid applied
the amount thereof to a worthless past indebtedness of the defendant
Waggoner and corporations in which he was interested. In an action
to determine the rights of and relations between the parties and for
an accounting, in which the Central Bank attacks the sufficiency of
the complaint, Held, the complaint states a cause of action to charge
the corporate defendant as trustee ex inwleficio; it is, however, incum-
bent upon the plaintiffs to trace the funds so deposited by them
through the depositary to the corporate defendant. McAvoy, J., dis-
I Bullard v. Grace Co., 240 N. Y. 338, 148 N. E. 559 (1925).
'Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. v. Liverpool Marine & Gen. Ins. Co., 24
L. Rep. 85 (H. L., 1926).
'York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 15, Sup. Ct. (1890) ; (1930) 39 Yale L. J. 575.
'Kitts. v. Moore, 1 Q. B. 253 (1894).
